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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Vijay K. Mago *
Elizabeth E. Clarke **
Eric Wallace ***
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past two years, there have been several significant
developments in labor and employment law, both on the state and
federal levels. Because developments in both state and federal
law likely will have a profound impact on employers and employees throughout Virginia, they warrant significant discussion in
this survey.
In addition to examining notable decisions from the Supreme
Court of the United States, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, and the United States District Courts for
the Eastern District and Western District of Virginia, this survey
also discusses decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia regarding employment issues as they relate to state law.
Because this article constitutes a survey of labor and employment law, it necessarily is limited in depth as well as substantive
and temporal scope. Specifically, this article focuses on developments occurring over the prior two years, since January 2011.
II. SOCIAL MEDIA
Social media, including Facebook, Twitter, and other social
networking sites, now affects the daily lives of Americans, and
employers and employees are no exception. As social media con* Partner, LeClairRyan, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1996, University of Richmond School of Law; B.S., 1993, James Madison University.
** Associate, LeClairRyan, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2010, Washington & Lee
University School of Law; B.A., 2005, Washington & Lee University.
*** J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 2008, Washington & Lee University.
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tinues to expand, both employers and employees should be aware
of the potential legal effects of their social media conduct.
The Eastern District of Virginia recently addressed individual
social media conduct in rejecting a claim by employees that “lik1
ing” a political figure on Facebook constitutes free speech. In
Bland v. Roberts, Judge Jackson granted summary judgment for
the defendant, a sheriff who allegedly fired several of his employ2
ees in retaliation for “liking” his political opponent on Facebook.
Following his reelection, the sheriff declined to retain the six
plaintiff employees and an additional six deputies on grounds
that their actions “hindered the harmony and efficiency of the Of3
fice.” The plaintiffs claimed that the sheriff failed to reappoint
them in retaliation for their exercise of their First Amendment
4
right to freedom of political speech. Despite the plaintiffs’ claims,
Judge Jackson held that “liking” a political figure on Facebook
does not amount to expressive speech as “merely ‘liking’ a Facebook page is insufficient speech to merit constitutional protection.”5 Additionally, the court held that even if “liking” something
on Facebook constitutes expressive speech, the plaintiffs did not
sufficiently allege that such speech touched upon a matter of public concern.6
Judge Jackson distinguished this case from others, noting that
courts have extended constitutional speech protections “to Facebook posts [where the speech at issue consists of] actual statements.”7 Likewise, the court noted that “Facebook posts can be
considered matters of public concern.”8 Thus, despite the failure
of the Bland plaintiffs, employees who post on political pages or
discuss political topics on their own Facebook pages likely will be
afforded First Amendment protection so long as: (i) the employee
makes a substantive statement of public concern as a citizen rather than “a personal matter of personal interest” as an employee;
(ii) the employee’s interest in speaking upon the matter out-

1.
2012).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See Bland v. Roberts, No. 4:11cv45, 2012 WL 1428198, at *2–3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 24,
Id. at *1.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
See id. (footnote omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at *4.
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weighs “the government’s interest in providing effective and efficient services to the public;” and (iii) the employee’s speech was a
substantial factor in the termination decision.9
III. TITLE VII
A. Retaliation
Retaliation claims remain popular because of the generous protections Title VII affords employees. Because they frequently survive summary judgment and the underlying elements are comparatively easy for jurors to grasp, retaliation claims continue to
enjoy increasing popularity. Three recent decisions, one from the
Supreme Court and two from the Eastern District of Virginia, expand the scope of Title VII protections for retaliation claims and
10
reinforce the efficacy of such claims.
First, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, the Supreme Court expanded the definition of an “aggrieved” person to
include third parties, who now can effectively claim retaliation
under Title VII.11 The Court held that an employee was unlawfully retaliated against when he was fired after his fiancée filed a
gender discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).12 The employee’s fiancée had filed a
charge against the couple’s employer, alleging sex discrimina13
tion. The Court noted that an “aggrieved” person under Title VII
includes any person with an interest arguably sought to be protected by the statute, abrogating a narrower lower court decision.14 Applying Title VII protections to a third party, the Court
recognized that the employee at issue fell within the “zone of interests” the statute was meant to protect.15 Specifically, the em9. See id. at *2–3 (quoting McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277–78 (4th Cir. 1998))
(discussing application of the Fourth Circuit’s three-prong test to determine whether an
employment action violates an employee’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech).
10. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011); Edwards v. Murphy-Brown, L.L.C., 802 F. Supp. 2d 670 (E.D. Va. 2011); Coles v. Deltaville
Boatyard, LLC, No. 3:10cv491-DWD, 2011 WL 1750896 (E.D. Va. May 6, 2011).
11. See 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 868, 870 (citing Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v.
First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 495 (1998)).
12. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 867, 870.
13. See id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 867.
14. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 869 (citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442
(1971)).
15. See id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
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ployee was targeted directly by the employer as an unlawful reaction to the fiancée’s sex discrimination claim.16
In Edwards v. Murphy-Brown, L.L.C., the Eastern District of
Virginia held in favor of a female employee who brought sexual
harassment and retaliation claims against her employer by deny17
ing the employer’s motion to dismiss. Over the course of six
years, this employee filed a series of complaints with her employer regarding sexually offensive behavior, including an incident in
which a male employee was caught spying on the plaintiff and
another female employee who were changing in the women’s
18
shower room, by using peep holes he had drilled in the door.
When the incident was reported to the employer’s human resources department, the employee was belittled and subsequently
19
reassigned; the offending employees were never reprimanded. In
rejecting the employer’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the
plaintiff plausibly alleged “materially adverse conduct that would
dissuade a reasonable person from raising a claim of discrimination.”20 In support of its decision, the court cited the Supreme
Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. White, in which the Court held that a job reassignment may be
actionable retaliation under Title VII.21 Importantly, the Edwards
court took a broad view, considering “all circumstances,” before
deciding that a reasonable juror could find the job reassignment
to be “materially adverse.”22
In a third case, the Eastern District of Virginia again ruled in
favor of an employee on his claim of unlawful retaliation under
Title VII.23 In Coles v. Deltaville Boatyard, LLC, an employee filed
a charge with the EEOC against his former employer alleging
that during his employment he was subjected to racial discrimination.24 The plaintiff’s former employer, Deltaville Boatyard,
contacted Coles’s subsequent employers about the EEOC charge
16. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
17. 802 F. Supp. 2d 670, 678 (E.D. Va. 2011).
18. See id. at 672 (citations and footnote omitted).
19. See id. (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 678.
21. Id. at 677 (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 71
(2006)).
22. Id. at 677–78.
23. See Coles v. Deltaville Boatyard, LLC, No. 3:10cv491-DWD, 2011 WL 1750896, at
*8 (E.D. Va. May 6, 2011).
24. Id. at *1 (citation omitted).

2012]

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

205

and warned the new employers that Coles might file a similar
charge.25 Deltaville suggested that the employers “proceed with
restraint and caution” towards Coles, or face similar “trouble.”26
In response, Coles filed suit alleging that Deltaville’s contact with
27
his subsequent employers constituted unlawful retaliation. The
court discussed the Burlington Northern test, considering whether the employer’s act “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
28
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” After
framing the issue this way, the court concluded that Coles met
the threshold, explaining that “an employee recently fired by one
employer might be dissuaded from filing an EEOC charge for that
termination if he knows that it would lead to a warning that he
29
might do the same to subsequent employers.” The court denied
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on this rationale.30
B. Race Discrimination
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed race discrimination in three recent decisions and held in
the employer’s favor in all three.31 In evaluating the claims, the
court focused on the reasonableness of the employers’ responses
to complaints of discrimination and the employers’ nondiscriminatory reasons supporting their disciplinary decisions.32
First, in EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., the Fourth Circuit addressed
the reasonableness of an employer’s delayed response in addressing employees’ racial discrimination complaints.33 Although African American assembly workers complained of racial slurs and
pranks from their white coworkers by reporting these incidents to

25. See id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
26. Id. at *1–2 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id. at *2.
28. Id. at *6 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 548 U.S. at 61, 68) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. at *7.
30. Id. at *8.
31. See Lauture v. Saint Agnes Hosp., 429 F. App’x 300, 309 (4th Cir. 2011); EEOC v.
Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 677 (4th Cir. 2011); Ali v. Energy Enter. Solutions, LLC, 414
F. App’x 531, 532 (4th Cir. 2011).
32. Lauture, 429 F. App’x at 306, 307; Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d at 676–77; Ali, 414 F.
App’x at 531–32.
33. See 639 F.3d at 668.
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their shift supervisor,34 no immediate action was taken by the
employer or its managers.35 Importantly, Xerxes had an antiharassment policy that required employees to report discrimina36
tion to both their shift supervisor and the plant manager. Although none of the employees subject to discrimination reported
the violations to the plant manager, the substance of the allegations did work its way up through the management chain to the
37
plant manager. In response to these complaints, Xerxes conducted an investigation, interviewed those involved, and sus38
pended two of the offending employees for two days. Xerxes also
warned the offending employees that future conduct in violation
of the company’s anti-harassment policy would not be tolerated,
and the company held additional anti-harassment training for all
39
employees.
In a separate incident, an African American employee found a
threatening note in his locker referencing the Ku Klux Klan.40
Xerxes investigated the incident and reported it to the local sheriff, but no employee was found responsible.41 Nevertheless, Xerxes
held a plant-wide meeting, informing all employees of the incident and the involvement of the sheriff’s department and reminding all employees of the company’s anti-harassment policies.42 In
light of the company’s response to both reported incidents, the
Fourth Circuit held that the employer’s actions were “reasonably
calculated to end the harassment and, therefore, reasonable as a
43
matter of law.”
A second Fourth Circuit decision, Ali v. Energy Enterprise Solutions, LLC, involved claims that a former employee was (i)
treated disparately based on his race (because the employer revoked plaintiff’s network privileges and paid him less than his
coworkers) and (ii) subjected to a retaliatory discharge.44 In a per

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 662–63 (citations omitted).
Id. at 661–63, 671.
Id. at 662 (citation omitted).
Id. at 662–63.
Id. at 664 (citation omitted).
Id. at 664–65 (citations and footnote omitted).
Id. at 665 (citation omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 671.
414 F. App’x 531, 531–32 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
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curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that plaintiff Ali’s disparate impact claim failed because he could not prove that others outside his protected class
were disciplined less severely and because he could not rebut the
employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the pay dif45
ferential. Moreover, Ali’s retaliation claim failed based on his refusal to cooperate with the employer’s attempt to find a position
46
suitable for reassignment. Because the plaintiff was unable to
rebut the employer’s defenses supporting its nondiscriminatory
rationale, the court affirmed summary judgment in the employ47
er’s favor.
Finally, in Lauture v. Saint Agnes Hospital, a former hospital
employee advanced allegations of discrimination based on race
and national origin, hostile work environment harassment,
breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
constructive discharge.48 In an opinion written by retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, sitting by designation, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the hospital.49 Despite the plaintiff’s allegations that the hospital failed to investigate her discrimination complaints and issued a report using the phrase
“Mexican stand-off” in reference to her disputes with a coworker,50
the court held that the actions were not “sufficiently severe and
pervasive to create an objectively abusive atmosphere,” as re51
quired to support her hostile work environment claim. The court
also held that Lauture failed to prove the hospital treated other
employees differently (to support her discrimination claim), as
her discipline was within the “range of discipline” the hospital
typically imposed for similar employee errors.52 Next, the court
dismissed Lauture’s breach of contract claim because, although
45. Id. at 531 (citing Cook v. CSX Transp. Co., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993)).
46. Id. at 532 (citing Montes v. Greater Twin Cities Youth Symphonies, 540 F.3d 852,
857–58 (8th Cir. 2008); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1389
(6th Cir. 1993)).
47. See id.
48. 429 F. App’x 300, 302 (4th Cir. 2011).
49. Id. at 302, 309.
50. Id. at 307 & n.3 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 307 (quoting Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 383 F.3d 180, 191 (4th
Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521
F.3d 306, 316–18 (4th Cir. 2008)).
52. Id. at 306 (quoting Cook v. CSX Transp. Co., 988 F.2d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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employee handbooks can constitute contracts, the hospital effectively disclaimed contractual liability by the explicit terms of the
handbook.53 Ultimately, because the plaintiff failed to carry her
burden of proof, the court affirmed summary judgment in the
54
hospital’s favor on all counts.
C. Gender Discrimination, Sexual Harassment & Hostile Work
Environment
1. Gender Discrimination
In a recent controversial decision, the Supreme Court held in
favor of mega-retailer Wal-Mart against a group of female employees alleging gender discrimination.55 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, the Court held that the evidence did not support the
plaintiffs’ allegation that the company operated under a general
policy of discrimination, as required to permit certification of the
plaintiff class.56 A group of 1.5 million current and former female
Wal-Mart employees alleged that the company discriminated
against them, particularly in promotion and compensation decisions.57 Both the district court and court of appeals approved class
certification for the women, but the Supreme Court held that certification of the class was not consistent with Rule 23(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the class
have common “questions of law or fact.”58
Specifically, the Court held that the employees’ case lacked the
requisite proof that the company operated under a general policy
of discrimination.59 Wal-Mart’s official policy forbids sex discrimination with penalties for violations.60 The Court found the
“[d]issimilarities” between the plaintiffs’ claims to be dispositive61

53. See id. at 308–09 (citing Mayers v. Wash. Adventist Hosp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 743,
751 (D. Md. 2001)).
54. Id. at 309.
55. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560–61 (2011).
56. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,
159 n.15 (1982)).
57. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
58. See id. at ___, S. Ct. at 2547, 2550–51, 2556–57 (citation and footnote omitted).
59. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
60. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in
the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)) (internal quotation marks
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because the pay and promotion decisions were delegated to store
managers.62 Consequently, the claim of each plaintiff would depend on her specific circumstances, rather than a broader dis63
criminatory policy at the corporate level. The Court’s holding
makes clear that future employee-plaintiffs seeking class certification first must satisfy a narrowly construed commonality requirement.
In another recent case, the Fourth Circuit held in favor of an
employer accused of gender-based discrimination.64 In Hoyle v.
Freightliner, LLC, the court accepted overstaffing as a nondiscriminatory reason for reassigning a female employee to janitorial duties, despite her claim that the real motive was discrimi65
nation. While working as a tractor trailer truck assembler for
Freightliner, the plaintiff’s male coworkers played pranks on her
and posted publicly viewable and sexually provocative pictures
around the workplace, including in the cafeteria and break
room.66 The plaintiff complained about the inappropriate pictures
to her supervisor, who in turn asked some of the employees to
take them down; however, the plaintiff asserted that the harassment continued, and she saw additional inappropriate pictures,
including a screensaver posted by coworkers on a company computer.67 Shortly after the screensaver incident, Freightliner transferred the plaintiff to a new position consisting mainly of janitorial duties.68
In rebutting the claim of sex discrimination, Freightliner argued that the plaintiff’s involuntary transfer was motivated by
her “undisputed . . . significant problems with absenteeism.”69 Despite a “last chance agreement” with Freightliner that any additional absenteeism would result in her immediate termination,
the plaintiff failed to show up for work and called in sick after the
start of her scheduled shift.70 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the
omitted).
62. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2554, 2560 (“Wal-Mart [was] entitled to individualized determinations of each employee’s eligibility for backpay.”).
63. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2555–56.
64. Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2011).
65. Id. at 337–38.
66. See id. at 326–27.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 327.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 327–28 (footnote omitted).
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district court’s determination that the plaintiff failed to “prove
her prima facie case [of sex discrimination] because she has not
identified any similarly situated employees who were treated
71
more favorably while on a last chance agreement.”
This interpretation of similarly situated employees reaffirms
the interpretation the Fourth Circuit established in its prior deci72
sions. Moreover, in dismissing the accompanying claim of retaliation, the Fourth Circuit held that, in light of the plaintiff’s continual absenteeism, Freightliner successfully “rebutted [the
plaintiff’s] prima facie case by alleging legitimate nondiscrimina73
tory reasons for transferring and eventually terminating [her].”
2. Sexual Harassment and Hostile Work Environment
The Fourth Circuit recently allowed plaintiffs’ claims of sexual
harassment to survive in three separate actions.74 In Harris v.
Mayor of Baltimore, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of
the district court, which granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, despite evidence that company employees posted
nude pictures in the workplace.75 The court held the female employees’ sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims
were sufficiently supported because coworkers used sexual and
profane language and posted nude and sexually explicit photos in
public view.76 The profane language used by male coworkers convinced the court that the harassment in the workplace was sufficiently severe and pervasive to be actionable.77
In the second case, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged a split between the circuit courts of appeal in the course of addressing
same-sex, third-party sexual harassment.78 In EEOC v. Cromer

71. Id. at 336–37 (quoting Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, No. 3:07-CV-00169, 2009 WL
2462098, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. See id. at 336 (citing Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 234 (4th Cir. 1999),
abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2002)).
73. See id. at 337–38.
74. See Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 332 (4th Cir. 2012); Harris
v. Mayor of Balt., 429 F. App’x 195, 197 (4th Cir. 2011); EEOC v. Cromer Food Servs., Inc.,
414 F. App’x 602, 603 (4th Cir. 2011).
75. See 429 F. App’x at 197, 198–99.
76. See id. at 201 (citations omitted).
77. See id. at 202.
78. See Cromer Food Servs., Inc., 414 F. App’x at 606 (citing Dunn v. Wash. Cnty., 429
F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005); Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005);
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Food Services, Inc., the Fourth Circuit vacated a district court
award of summary judgment in the employer’s favor and held
that the evidence was sufficient for the plaintiff’s claim to reach a
79
jury. The EEOC brought the action on behalf of a male employee
of Cromer Food Services who was responsible for stocking vending machines along a predefined route.80 One of the required stops
was a hospital, where two male employees would taunt this indi81
vidual by calling him a homosexual and propositioning him.
When the employee reported the harassment, his supervisor
“failed to take adequate action to combat the harassment on be82
half of the hospital employees.” Although the employer later offered to switch the harassed employee’s shift to an earlier time,
the court found such corrective action to be “too little, too late” in
the wake of months of inaction between the employee’s initial report of harassment and the eventual decision to transfer him.83
As stated, the Fourth Circuit also acknowledged a split between the circuit courts of appeal regarding “whether an employer may be liable for the activities of non-employees in a claim for
sexual harassment.”84 In seeking to resolve this split, the court
held that an employer is liable “if it knew or should have known
of the harassment and failed to take appropriate actions to halt
it.”85 Obviously, this decision expands employers’ potential liability for claims of harassment, as liability now may attach if the
employer knew or reasonably should have known of harassment
inflicted on employees by third parties, but failed to take corrective action to prevent the encounters leading to the harassment.
Finally, in Dulaney v. Packing Corp. of America, the Fourth
Circuit held that the plaintiff presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment on her claims of sexual harassment and
gender discrimination against her former employer.86 Dulaney alleged that her former manager conditioned her employment on
Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1258 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003); Turnbull v. Topeka
State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001)).
79. Id. at 603.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 608 (citing Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir.
1990)).
84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85. See Cromer Food Servs., Inc., 414 F. App’x at 607.
86. 673 F.3d 323, 333 (4th Cir. 2012).
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receipt of sexual favors.87 In granting summary judgment, the district court held that, because the employer took no tangible employment action against Dulaney, it was entitled to invoke the
88
Faragher-Ellerth defense as a matter of law. Consistent with
this holding, the district court found (i) the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior and (ii) Dulaney unreasonably failed to take
advantage of the employer’s preventative or corrective opportuni89
ties. On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit applied the Faragher-Ellerth definition of “tangible employment action” to find
that evidence in the record, including a company memorandum
labeling Dulaney as “terminated,” presented a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the plaintiff actually did suffer a tan90
gible employment action. Moreover, the court found that other
evidence in the record (e.g., a company manager laughing at
Dulaney when she first complained) at least suggested a nexus
between the plaintiff’s harassment and termination, such that
summary judgment was inappropriate.91
Altogether, these cases illustrate the Fourth Circuit’s willingness to review the entire record with scrutiny when presented
with grants of summary judgment in the employer’s favor, but only where genuine disputes of material fact in the record have been
ignored or marginalized or when the corrective actions proffered
by the employer are not actually prompt or corrective.
IV. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
A. Americans with Disabilities Act
This year, the Fourth Circuit established unequivocally that an
employee’s inability to work overtime does not constitute a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).92 In Bo-

87. See id. at 325–26 (citations and footnotes omitted).
88. Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 7:09-cv-00063, 2010 WL 4736615, at *4
(W.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2010); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08
(1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 764–65 (1998).
89. See Dulaney, 2010 WL 4736615, at *5.
90. See Dulaney, 673 F.3d at 331–32.
91. Id. at 333.
92. See Boitnott v. Corning Inc., 669 F.3d 172, 176 (4th Cir. 2012).
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itnott v. Corning Inc., the court affirmed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff employee’s inability to work overtime due to cardiac difficulties and treatment
93
did not constitute a disability.
Corning, in an effort to promote efficiency and continuity in its
manufacturing processes, limited its workforce primarily to
twelve-hour shifts, rotating its employees between daytime and
94
nighttime schedules. After experiencing cardiac difficulties and
a diagnosis of leukemia, Boitnott, an employee of Corning, was
95
medically restricted to eight work hours per day. Based on his
ability to work a normal workweek total of forty hours, “Corning
took the position that [Boitnott did not qualify as] disabled under
96
the ADA.” Because the twelve-hour shift schedule expectation
exceeded his medical restriction, Boitnott did not return to work
but, instead, applied for long-term disability benefits.97 Not surprisingly, these long-term disability benefits subsequently were
terminated because of Boitnott’s ability to work a normal fortyhour workweek.98 At the same time, Boitnott filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that Corning failed to afford
him a “reasonable accommodation” by refusing to allow him to
work only eight hours per day.99 Boitnott asserted that his inability to work more than eight hours per day, as a result of his physical impairments, rendered him “disabled” under the ADA.100
Thereafter, Corning and the employee union of which Boitnott
was a member entered into negotiations and authorized a new
position limited to eight-hour shifts; Boitnott was hired for the
position and formally returned to work with Corning in September 2005.101 The lawsuit, however, remained.
The Fourth Circuit, in affirming summary judgment for Corning, held that “an inability to work overtime does not constitute a
‘substantial’ limitation on a major life activity under the ADA.”102

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. at 172–73.
Id. at 173 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 172.
Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
Id. at 176.
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In support of its decision, the court noted that, importantly, “[a]ll
circuits courts which have addressed this issue have held that an
employee under the ADA is not ‘substantially’ limited” in “‘one or
more major life activities’ if [he] is capable of working a normal
forty hour work week but is not able to work overtime.”103
This decision makes clear that employers do not have to provide reasonable accommodation for employees who can work
normal forty-hour workweeks but are not physically able to work
additional hours, so long as the employee’s inability to work overtime does not “significantly restrict[]” the employee’s ability to
perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs, as compared to
104
the average person of comparable training, skills, and abilities.
Put more simply, the employer does not have to offer any accommodation so long as the employee’s inability to work overtime
does not restrict him from working in his chosen field. In this
case, there was no evidence that Boitnott’s inability to work overtime “‘significantly restricted’ his ability to perform a class of jobs
or a broad range of jobs” and, therefore, the district court’s grant
of summary judgment for Corning was affirmed.105
B. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
In January 2011, the Fourth Circuit clarified that even governmental bodies are not exempt from an EEOC-issued subpoena
106
requesting personnel information relating to an investigation.
In EEOC v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, Judge
Wilkinson held that the state utility’s assertion of legislative immunity and privilege was “premature” and, thus, did not provide
a basis for the court to decline to enforce the subpoena.107 The
court reasoned that, under the Age Discrimination in Employ-

103. Id. at 175 (citing Bialko v. Quaker Oats Co., 434 F. App’x 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2011);
Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598–99 (6th Cir. 2002); Miller v. Sw. Bell Tel.
Co., No. 01-21318, 2002 WL 31415083, at *5 (5th Cir. Oct. 7, 2002); Kellogg v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 233 F.3d 1083, 1087–88 (8th Cir. 2000); Taylor v. Nimock’s Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957,
960–61 (8th Cir. 2000); Tardie v. Rehab. Hosp. of R.I., 168 F.3d 538, 542 (1st Cir. 1999);
Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1145 (8th Cir. 1999); Parkinson v. Anne Arundel
Med. Ctr., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 511, 514–15 (D. Md. 2002)).
104. See id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3), app. at 390 (2011)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
105. See id. at 176–77.
106. See EEOC v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 631 F.3d 174, 177 (4th Cir.
2011)).
107. Id.
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ment Act, the EEOC has authority to investigate claims of age
discrimination.108 Along with this investigative authority, “Congress gave the EEOC commensurate authority to subpoena information and gave district courts jurisdiction to enforce those
109
subpoenas.” Although the EEOC’s subpoena authority has its
limits, including the evidentiary limitation of legislative privilege,
the court held that, while it recognized “the importance of legislative immunity and privilege, [it did] not believe the EEOC’s modi110
fied subpoena threaten[ed] them at the present time.” The court
noted that the EEOC limited its subpoena in an effort to avoid
requesting potentially privileged information from the sanitary
commission; accordingly, the court concluded it had “no basis for
111
not enforcing the subpoena.”
V. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND TRADE SECRETS
A. Restrictive Covenants
Although Virginia is regarded as an employer-friendly state,
recognizing only a very narrow exception to the employment-atwill doctrine, Virginia courts strongly disfavor covenants not to
compete as restraints on trade.
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently reiterated this position
in Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer, holding that a
non-compete provision restricting the employee from working in
the same industry in “any” capacity, even indirectly, was overbroad and unenforceable.112
In Shaffer, the employer sued Shaffer, its former employee, and
Shaffer’s new employer, alleging breach of contract and tortious
interference with contract.113 During his employment with Home
Paramount, Shaffer signed a non-competition agreement in which
he agreed not to “engage directly or indirectly or concern himself[]
in any manner whatsoever in the carrying on or conducting the
business of exterminating, pest control, termite control and/or

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id. at 180 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (2006)).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(a)).
Id. at 180, 182 (citing Burtnick v. McLean, 76 F.3d 611, 613 (4th Cir. 1996)).
See id. at 185.
282 Va. 412, 414, 419, 718 S.E.2d 762, 763, 765 (2011).
See id. at 415, 718 S.E.2d at 763.
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fumigation services.”114 The provision set forth a time limitation of
two years.115 Shaffer, however, resigned from Home Paramount
and, within this two year period, accepted employment with an116
other pest control company.
In assessing the enforceability of this restriction, the Supreme
Court of Virginia noted it will enforce a non-competition agreement only if the employer proves it is “narrowly drawn to protect
the employer’s legitimate business interest, is not unduly burdensome on the employee’s ability to earn a living, and is not against
117
public policy.” As part of this assessment, the court considered
the “‘function, geographic scope, and duration’ elements of the restriction.”118 Regarding the “function” prong, the court reasoned
that valid restrictions prohibit “an employee from engaging in activities that actually or potentially compete with the employee’s
former employer.”119 When, as here, the employer seeks to limit its
former employee from working for its competition in any capacity,
the employer must establish a legitimate business interest for doing so or the restriction will fail.120
The court found that Home Paramount failed to establish any
legitimate business interest in support of its broad restriction and
observed that the provision “prohibits Shaffer from working for
[his new employer] or any other business in the pest control industry in any capacity,” including even indirect engagement.121
Accordingly, the court concluded that the provision was overbroad
122
and unenforceable.

114. Id. at 414–15, 718 S.E.2d at 763.
115. Id. at 415, 718 S.E.2d at 763.
116. See id.
117. Id., 718 S.E.2d at 763–64 (quoting Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Investigations Servs., Inc., 270 Va. 246, 249, 618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (2005)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
118. Id. at 415–16, 718 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 581, 544
S.E.2d 666, 678 (2001)).
119. Id. at 417, 718 S.E.2d at 765 (quoting Omniplex World Servs. Corp., 270 Va. at
249, 618 S.E.2d at 342)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. at 417–18, 718 S.E.2d at 765 (citing Modern Env’ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 263 Va.
491, 495, 561 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002)).
121. Id. at 418, 718 S.E.2d at 765.
122. Id. at 420, 718 S.E.2d at 766.
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B. Trade Secrets
In stark contrast, Virginia courts, through application of the
Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“VUTSA”),123 place a much
lighter burden on employers advancing claims of trade secrets violations.
This year, the Supreme Court of Virginia highlighted this more
lenient standard in Collelo v. Geographic Services, Inc., holding
that the VUTSA does not require that one accused of misappropriating a trade secret also must actually use the trade secret to
124
compete with the holder of the trade secret. Geographic Ser125
vices performs “geographic names, or ‘geonames,’ work.” In
2006, Geographic Services hired Collelo and trained him to perform its geonames work.126 In so doing, Geographic Services exposed Collelo to confidential information and purported trade secrets.127 Given the nature of his employment, Collelo signed an
employment contract containing a non-disclosure provision that
prohibited Collelo from disclosing Geographic Services’ confidential information “to any person or entity without first obtaining
[Geographic Services’] written consent.”128 In 2008, Collelo resigned from Geographic Services and accepted a position with
Boeing, working in a non-geonames capacity.129 Soon thereafter,
however, Geographic Services learned that Collelo was performing geonames work and, accordingly, advised Boeing that Collelo
was violating the non-disclosure provision in his employment contract.130 After Geographic Services learned that Collelo continued
to perform geonames work at Boeing, it filed a motion for judgment against Collelo and Boeing for breach of contract, tortious
interference with a contract, and violations of the VUTSA.131
At trial, the defendants filed a motion to strike, arguing, among
other things, that Geographic Services offered no evidence that

123. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
124. 283 Va. 56, 71, 721 S.E.2d 508, 516 (2012) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 (Repl.
Vol. 2006)).
125. Id. at 61, 721 S.E.2d at 510.
126. Id. at 62, 721 S.E.2d at 511.
127. Id.
128. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at 63, 721 S.E.2d at 511.
130. Id.
131. Id., 721 S.E.2d at 511–12.
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Boeing competes directly with Geographic Services for geonames
work and, consequently, Collelo could not be found in breach of
the non-disclosure provision at issue.132 Reasoning that Boeing
and Geographic Services were not market competitors, the trial
133
court granted defendants’ motion.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed in part and
134
affirmed in part. Specifically, the court held that, in order for
the trade secrets claim to be actionable under the VUTSA, Boeing
did not have to actually use the misappropriated trade secret to
135
compete with Geographic Services. Accordingly, the trial court
erred in granting the defendants’ motion to strike under the
VUTSA.136 Despite this holding, the supreme court affirmed the
trial court’s dismissal of the breach of contract and tortious interference with a contract claims because Geographic Services failed
to present sufficient evidence of any damages.137
As a result of the Collelo case, the message to employers and
employees is clear. Misappropriation is complete—and actionable—merely by disclosure of the trade secret without consent or
acquisition by a person who “knows or has reason to know that
138
the trade secret was acquired by improper means.”
VI. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Finally, in a matter of first impression, the Fourth Circuit clarified what constitutes “protected activity” under the Fair Labor
139
Standards Act (“FLSA”). In Minor v. Bostwick Laboratories,
Inc., the Fourth Circuit applied recent precedent from the Supreme Court to hold that intra-company complaints qualify as
“protected activities” under the FLSA.140

132. Id. at 64, 721 S.E.2d at 512.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 80, 721 S.E.2d at 520.
135. Id. at 71, 721 S.E.2d at 516 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 (Repl. Vol. 2006))
(“Accordingly, the Trade Secrets Act does not require that one who is accused of misappropriating a trade secret use the allegedly misappropriated trade secret to compete with the
holder of the trade secret.”).
136. Id. at 79, 721 S.E.2d at 520.
137. See id. at 76, 721 S.E.2d at 518.
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
139. See Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc., 669 F.3d 428, 431 (4th Cir. 2012).
140. Id. at 436–37 (citing Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S.
___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333 (2011)).
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Specifically, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether a complaint
lodged by Minor, a unionized employee of Bostwick, during a department meeting—as opposed to a complaint filed with a court
or government agency—triggered the protection of the FLSA’s an141
ti-retaliation provision. During this meeting with Bostwick’s
chief operating officer, Minor complained that she believed her
supervisor willfully violated the FLSA by altering employees’
time sheets to reflect that they had not worked overtime when, in
142
fact, they had. Six days later, Bostwick terminated Minor’s employment, explaining that there was “too much conflict with [her]
143
supervisors and the relationship just [was not] working.”
Minor filed a complaint against Bostwick in the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that Bostwick fired her in retaliation for
engaging in protected activity, as defined by the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision.144 In ruling on Bostwick’s motion to dismiss,
the district court held that complaints are protected by the
FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision only if they constitute a formal,
official proceeding.145 Because Minor alleged only that she was
discharged in retaliation for reporting the alleged violations to
company management during this department meeting, the district court granted Bostwick’s motion to dismiss.146
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp., in which the Court resolved whether an employee’s oral
complaints qualified as a protected activity under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.147 In holding that such oral complaints did
qualify as protected activity, the Court explained that “[t]o fall
within the scope of the antiretaliation provision, a complaint
must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer
to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection.”148 Although the Court declined to address whether an intra-

141. Id. at 431.
142. Id. at 430.
143. Id. (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. at 430–31 (footnote omitted).
145. Id. at 431.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 432 (citing Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. ___,
___ , 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1330 (2011)).
148. Kasten, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1335.
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company complaint constitutes a protected activity under the
FLSA expressly, it framed the fair notice requirement in terms of
whether a “reasonable employer” would understand a particular
149
complaint to be an assertion of rights under the FLSA.
Although it adopted the Kasten Court’s reasoning, the Fourth
Circuit recognized that the case was not directly controlling and,
consequently, reviewed the anti-retaliation provision independently and concluded that the statute’s language, “filed any
complaint,” is ambiguous as to whether intra-company com150
plaints qualify as protected activity. Finally, after considering
the purpose of the FLSA and its anti-retaliation provision, the
Fourth Circuit declined to adopt the district court’s formalistic
approach, instead holding that “[a]llowing intracompany complaints to constitute protected activity . . . comports with the
statute’s objectives as described by Congress’s findings and the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of those findings.”151 Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s
grant of the employer’s motion to dismiss.152
When viewed together with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kasten, this decision may tie the hands of employers seeking to
discipline or terminate employees who arguably have engaged in
protected activity under the FLSA through an intra-company
complaint. Although any employee complaint must provide adequate and fair notice to the employer and be “sufficiently clear
and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it,” these
decisions make clear that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision
does not merely cover formal and official complaints to courts or
administrative bodies.153 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held consistently that the FLSA “must not be interpreted or applied in a
narrow, grudging manner,”154 and the majority of circuits have focused on the FLSA’s remedial purpose in holding that intracompany complaints constitute protected activities.155 For this
149. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1334–35 (citations omitted).
150. Minor, 669 F.3d at 433–35.
151. Id. at 437.
152. Id. at 439.
153. Kasten, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1335; Minor, 669 F.3d at 436–37.
154. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944).
155. See, e.g., Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008);
Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); EEOC v. White & Son
Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383,
387 (10th Cir. 1984); Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975).
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reason, employers should expect courts to apply a more flexible,
interpretive approach in addressing whether an employee’s criticism qualifies for protection under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation
provision.
VII. CONCLUSION
There were several important developments in labor and employment law, on both the federal and state levels, during the
past two years. A federal court in Virginia clarified that social
media activity must constitute “actual statements” in order for an
employee to take shelter under the First Amendment from employment discipline, and another court expanded even further the
scope of retaliation claims, such that a third party can constitute
an “aggrieved” person able to make a claim under Title VII. Further, the Fourth Circuit addressed a split between its sister
courts when it held that employers can be liable for the harassment of non-employees if the employer knew or should have
known of the harassing conduct yet failed to take prompt, corrective action to mitigate interaction. Significantly, not all of these
cases expanded the rights of employees, as the Fourth Circuit also clarified that an employee’s inability to work overtime does not
constitute a “disability” under the ADA.
Altogether, although Virginia remains an employer-friendly
state, Virginia courts continue to scrutinize the acts of employers
to apply—and sometimes expand—the protections available to
employees. While the courts’ application of the VUTSA may ease
the burden for employers asserting trade secrets violations, we
saw the Fourth Circuit, in three separate cases, indicate its willingness to scrutinize district courts’ grants of summary judgment
in the employer’s favor, requiring lower courts to consider the entire record before them and not marginalize issues which may be
genuine disputes of material fact. Ultimately, however, summary
judgment still remains a viable conclusion for employers defending employment-related cases.

